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This paper studies a situation in which two previously 
isolated countries decide to unite their currencies and 
their fiscal policies. We assume that initially there is a 
"so ft currency" country and a "hard currency" country. 
Givenfiscalpolicy, westudytherange ofexchangeratesof 
"soft"  for  "hard"  currency  that are feasible set.  The 
inflation  rate  under the  new consolidated  government 
depends on thefiscal policy itfollows, but does not depend 
on the exchange rate selected. 
OnJuly2,1990, EastandWest Germany became united 
through a common currency.  The West German Deutsche 
Mark (DM) became the only legal tender on both sides of 
the border, and debts  and payments denominated  in the 
East German  Ostmark (OM) were  converted to DM at 
rates stipulated in an agreement signed  by both govern­
ments on May 2. 
Themonetary union ofEastand West Germany raises a 
variety of issues, including the consequences ofchoosing 
one conversion rate over other possible rates,  the price 
level  implications  of  the  conversion ,  and the  welfare 
implications  of the conversion for  citizens  of the two 
countries. To shed light on some the issues involved, this 
paperprovides atheoreticalanalysisof German monetary 
unification . 
Our analysis relies  on a  standard  model  of  money, 
specifically, the overlapping  generations  model  of Sam­
uelson (1958). Althoughothermodels,suchasthecash-in­
advance model , are available, our key conclusions depend 
onaspects ofthemodel thatwould appearinvirtually any 
model of money, namely, the budget constraints ofthetwo 
governments and the demand  for  fiat currency in each of 
the two countries being a function of the rate of return on 
currency.  Thus, very  similar results  would  emerge  from 
these other models. 
We  analyze  two countries  which  initially  manage  to 
isolate themselves, so that neither country trades with or 
borrows from theother, nordotheresidents ofone country 
hold the currency of the other.  One country  balances  its 
budget and thereby  supports a zero-inflation  monetary 
system.  There  is also a country  that runs  a persistent 
government deficit and finances the deficit bya combina­
tionofinflation tax andrepressedinflation. We model re­
pressed inflation as a legal restriction or rationing scheme 
thatforces citizens to hold more currency thanthey volun­
tarily would . This produces  a "currency overhang"  and 
repressed  inflation.  These  legal  restrictions  are  to  be 
interpreted inthe mannerofBryant andWallace (1984) as 
devices to increase the base of theinflation tax. 
We  refer to the first country as the "hard currency 
country"  because the value of its currency is stable over 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco  33 time (there is zeroor low inflation), andpeople holdand
exchange its currency voluntarily. We refer to the other
country as the "soft currency country" because its cur-
rency lacks oneor bothof those attributes: the value of
its currency is deteriorating over time, and/or particular
classes of people (typically, citizens of the softcurrency
country) arerequired tohold some ofitscurrency involun-
tarily, eitherthrough explicit savings requirements oras a
consequence of a commodity rationing scheme.
We compare the initial situation with.a second one
whichwecallmonetary union: intheformer softcurrency
country, thecontrols thatforced residents to hold thesoft
currency aredismantled. Thecurrency andcreditmarkets
areunited withthose ofthehardcurrency country. In the
process, thenew, consolidated government chooses a rate
at which theold, softcurrency willbe exchanged forthe
new, single currency. We study howtheinflation rateinthe
unified monetary system depends onthefiscal policy ofthe
new government. We show thatthereisarangeofratesthat
can be sustained as equilibrium exchange rates, and we
study the welfare consequences of a choice in thisrange.
I. Overview
or
where D is thereal value, assumed constant over time, of
that portion of the deficit financed by currency creation.
Thisbudget constraint canbewritten as

















which decomposes the amount of inflation tax collected
into the product of thebase forthe tax and the tax rate.
When thedemand forcurrency isanincreasing function
ofR, the inflation taxrevenue function f(R)(1- R) is as
depicted in Figure 1. As R rises from some low value,
f(R )(1- R) initially risesbecause thebaseofthetaxf(R)
risesfaster thantherate1-Rfalls. Eventually, however, as
Rrisestoward 1,thatis,asinflation falls toO,f(R)(1-R)
begins to fall toward O. Notice that, as a result of the
curve's shape, if there exists one tax rate that finances a
0l-- ----::;~~----~---
Inasteady statesituation, Rt - 1 = R, = R, sotheabove
equation becomes
f (R) x (1- R) = D
(1)
H(t) - H(t-l) = D
p(t) ,
In this section, we provide a brief overview of our
arguments andresults. Ourreasoning exploits properties
of two basicrelationships: a demand function forgovern-
ment-issued currency, andthe government's budget con-
straint.
Inthemodel weuse, money isheldvoluntarily byagents
to an extent determined by thereturn oncurrency. Since
currency does not pay explicit interest, the real rate of
returnon currency is thechange in itspurchasing power.
Sinceweprefertowork with gross rates ofreturn (one plus
the netchange), wedenote therateofreturn oncurrency
fromt tot+IasRt=p(t)/p(t+1),wherep(t) istheprice
level att. We assume thattherealdemand for currency ina
country isanincreasing function ofRt, which wedenote by
f(Rt );thenominal supply, orstock ofcurrency att isH(t),
and f(Rt ) = H(t)/p(t).
A government can raise real revenues by generating
inflation, thereby imposing aninflation taxonpeople who
holdcurrency from ttot+1. The basefor thetaxisf(R t ) ,
therealamountofcurrencyheld,while therate ofthetaxis
1-R; The government's budget constraint at t can be
writtenas
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R (fe(R) + f w (R»(1-R) ~
= f(R)(1-R)
De + Ow I-------~~~--~----
H(1) He(O) + eHw (0)





deficits, so that the deficit of the unified government is
simplyD = DE + Dw.Thedemand forthenew currency
isf(R) = fE(R) + fw(R), sothattheinflation taxrevenue
is (1-R) [fE(R) + fw(R)).
Figure2depicts theequilibrium values forR andp(1) in
the new regime. Inspection of that figure shows that
whether an equilibrium exists in thenewregime does not
dependonthevalue of theexchange rate e. Indeed, if an
equilibrium exists, therearemanyvalues ofecompatible
with thatequilibrium.'A stationary equilibrium depends
only on the size of DE + Dw relative to the maximum
height attained by the inflation tax revenue function
(1- R)(fE(R) +fw(R) ). Whena stationary equilibrium
exists,thevalue ofe influences thevalue ofthepricelevel
p(l): the higheris e, the higherp(1) will be. Thus, our
apparatus distinguishes sharply between the "level" and
"rate of change"effects. Thesetting of e is irrelevant for
the steady stateinflation rateunderthe new regime, bute
does influence the "one-time" inflation at the start of the
newregime.
In the remainder of this paper we use this model to
elaborate on the consequences of the move to monetary
unification. We study what difference the choice of e
makes,andto whom. We find thatthechoice ofe matters
to easterners and westerners who enter unification with
either assets ordebts denominated in either former cur-
rency, but that it doesn't affect the welfare of others.
Although the exact detail of who wins and loses in the
process ofunification maydependonourparticularmodel
(whichis the overlapping generations model of Samuel-
son, asnotedabove), thegeneralmacroeconomic features
or
H(1) H(O)
f(R) = p(l) = p(l) + D.
Thisequation canbesolved forp (1) asafunction ofD and
H(O). We can use Figure 1 to pick off the value off(R)
associated withtheequilibrium R.
Ourmodel ofEastandWest Germany before unification
describes thetwoseparate economies usingtwo versions
ofFigure 1,onewithavery lowD, theotherwithahighD.
Thecountry thatrunsa lowdeficitD attains ahighreturn
on moneyR and a lowinflation rate. Thecountry witha
higherD attains alowerR, assuming itiswilling to allow
thepricelevel tobedetermined freely bythesupply ofand
demand forits currency. Laterin this paper, wedescribe
some measures that a government can take to enhance
artificially thedemand foritscurrency. Usinga version of
Figure1,weshallshowhowsuchmeasures canbeusedto
raise the baseof the inflation tax andreduce thetaxrate
needed to finance a given deficit. We represent East
Germany ashaving resortedto suchmeasures.
Our approach to studying currency unification can be
summarized by constructing a figure as thevertical sum-
mationofthetwoversions ofFigure 1.Atsome time t = 1,
we suppose thatthe twocountries opentheirborders and
consolidate both their currencies and their government
budgets. Thestockof the new currency is the sumof the
old western currency and the old easterncurrency multi-
pliedbyanexchange ratee: theoldeasterncurrency is, in
effect, exchanged forthe new currency at a rateofe DM
per OM. Thismeans that the currency stockinherited at
timet= 1fromtheoldregime isHw(O) + eHE(O), where
thesubscripts WandErefertoWest andEast,respectively.
Wewant tostudytheconsequences ofalternative values of
e. The unified monetary-fiscal authority assumes the old
steady statedeficit D, thenthereare in general twosuch
rates.Forreasons indicated below, wewillassume thatwe
are always in the "good" equilibrium (withahigher R or,
equivalently, a lowerinflation rate).
For a single closedeconomy, Figure 1can be used to
determine the steady stateequilibrium value ofR, andan
initial pricelevel p(l) at sometime t= 1. First, theequi-
libriumR isdetermined bytheintersection off(R) (1- R)
withthedeficitD. Then, giventhatvalue ofR, equation (1)
writtenatt= 1canbemanipulated toyieldanequation that
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onlyonfeatures ofthedemand formoney andthegovern-
ment budget constraint that are embodied in Figures 1
and 2.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents the basic economic model we use to
describe a closed monetary economy, and some of the
policyoptions opento themonetary-fiscal authorities. In
Section IIIweindicate which options areassumed tohave
beenchosen by theauthorities of thetwo countries. Sec-
tion IV describes the consequences of a monetary unifi-
cation hitherto unforeseen and suddenly implemented.
Section Vexamines theeffects ofananticipated monetary
unification. Section VI examines anticipated unification
when there isuncertainty about theexact terms ofunifica-
tion. Finally, Section VII discusses some qualifications.
II. TheModel
Wewillbeusinganoverlapping generations model ofa
simplekind. Models of thetypeusedin this paperwere
usedbyWallace (1980), Sargent andWallace (1981,1982),
BryantandWallace (1984) andSargent (1987). Thepresen-
tation in this papermost closely follows Sargent (1987).
Time is discrete and starts at t= 1. Each period, a
generation is born, which is destined to livetwo periods,
andisindexed bythesubscript t; also,inperiod 1,there are
agents called the initial old, who live only one period.
Thereis a single consumption good in eachperiod. The
agents'identical preferences aredefined overconsumption
in each period of theirlives; these preferences arerepre-
sentedbyu(c/t),c/t+1»;theinitial oldhave preferences
uo(co(1». The vector of endowments in both periods is
representedbythepair(6)7 (t), w7 (t+1», where h indexes
the agent. We allow thepossibility thatsome agents have
different endowments from others. There isnoproduction
inthis model, noris there anyuncertainty.
Therearetwo countries, calledEastandWest. Variables
thatarespecific toeithercountry carry anEorWsubscript.
Each country has a constant population of size 2N i for
i E {E,W}.Beforethemonetaryreform, eachcountry hasa
government which cancollect lump-sum taxes onagenth
of generation t. After-tax endowments will be called
(w1 (t), w7 (t+1». Ourintention istofocus onthechanges
in fiscal policy that willbe feasible afterunification; for
thisreason, weconsider thetaxschedule prevailing before
unification asgiven, andsubsume itintheafter-tax endow-
ments.Later, wewillanalyze departures from thisinitial
state.
A government canalsoissue intrinsically useless pieces
of papercalledEast or West Marks (anddenoted EM or
WM). The total amount ofcurrency outstanding attheend
ofperiodtiswrittenHi(r). Theinitial oldinbothcountries
are endowed with an aggregate amount H/O) of their
currency. Governments purchase theconsumption good in
36
theamounts G/t), anddispose ofit in ways thatprocure
utility fornoone.
Eachperiod, there isamarket fortheconsumption good
in each country, and the price of the good in Marks is
writtenp/t). There isalsoamarket forloans among young
agents. We willassume thatthese loansaredenominated in
Marks, andcarrya nominal interest ratedenoted rt.
2 The
real interest rate on these loans, by definition, is R, =
rtp(t)/p(t+ 1).
We assume thatan impermeable separation stands be-
tween the two countries (a Wall), so that no interaction
takes place between EastandWest. This Wall was erected
before period 1, and is initially expected to stand in-
definitely.
We begin the analysis with a study of some of the
policies thatthe two governments can conduct. Forsim-
plicity, werepresent agovernment's taskas thefinancing
ofaconstant deficit oftaxes with respect toexpenditures,
denoted D=:::'O. A government can require the young in
eachgeneration to holda minimum amount A =:::.0 of the
currency in real terms. The parameter A is a policy
instrument that is designed to influence the base of the
inflation tax. 3
We willstudy two possible regimes; inthefirst one, Ais
set equal to 0, so that constraint (2), below, is only the
traditional onewhich forbids agents to issuecurrency. In
the second regime, A is positive, and the corresponding
constraint isbinding. These options areavailable ineither
country, and this section sets forth the analytics in the
context of a single, closed economy withgeneral endow-
ment patterns. We will later specify which regime will
prevail in eachcountry.
Allyoung agents solve thefollowing problem:
max u(ct(t), ct(t+ 1» (P)
c/t), ct(t+ 1), let)
Economic Review / Fall1990This equation states that the net saving of generation t
equals the net dissaving of generation t- 1 and of the
government.
Equation (3) defines a one-to-one mappingbetween R,
andh(t) = H(t) INp(t). We useit toreplace H(t)Ipet) in
where l(t) denotes the. amount lent (orborrowed, if nega-
tive) by the youngagent, and met) the agent's choice of
money holdings.
Theequilibrium isthesolution totheagents'maximiza-
tionproblem, thegoverment's budgetconstraint, aswellas
anequilibriumcondition in thecreditmarket.
Regime1:Either A. = 0orthecurrency constraintisnever
binding









(3). Writing d=DIN, weexpress condition (3)as
f(Rt) = Rt-t!(Rt- l ) + d (5)
Rt = t:' (Rt-t!(Rt- l ) + d)
= <p(Rt - l )·
Anequilibrium sequence {Rt} ";'= 1willsolve thisfirst-order
non-linear difference equation.
Thefunction <p cantakemanyforms, depending onthe
utilityfunction u. In thecasewhereu takestheform
u(cf'Ct+ l ) = In(ct) + In(ct+ l )
f is found to be
ill n,
feR) = 2 - 2R (6)
whereilj = t w7 fori E {1,2}, and(5)becomes
il2 If + 2d-ill-il2+ill Rt - l =0
t
which is shown in Figure3. Ifill > il2 holds, then for
values 0 ~ d ~ d* = (~ - v'TI;)2 there are two
stationary solutions forR (andforh), found byintersecting
the graphof d+Rf(R) with thatof f(R). Figure 4 shows
thefunction (1-R)f(R), andthetwostationary solutions
canbefound foranydeficit d < d*. In thecased= 0, the
- 0
twosolutions are 13 and1,wherewedefine 13 = 0
2 <1.
1
Underrational expectations dynamics, the lower gross
rateofreturnoncurrency, B., is stable, whilethehigherR,
isunstable. Anypathstartingath(1) E [0,hl(respectively
s, E [ ~2 R]) willconverge to b:. (respectively B.). Paths
startingat'h(1) >Ii(respectivelyR,> R) are notfeasible




and the equilibrium condition in thecreditmarketis
h = _ H(t)
~ ft(Rt)-Nf(Rt) - p(t) .
subjectto the constraints
m(t)+l(t)






rt = lorRt~ p(t+1)
Agents'decisions canberepresented byasaving function,
whichis thesolutiontothemaximization problem above.
Lettingf7(Rt) be thesaving ofagenthofgeneration t, we
have
f7(Rt) = w7(t) - C7(t),
whereR, = p(t)/p(t+1) is the rate of return on money
holdings.Thefunctionf7 willbe strictly increasing inRt,
undertheassumptionofgross substitutability ofconsump-
tionin thetwoperiods. It should bekeptinmindthatthis




D= () ,t>l pt -
H(t) H(t-1)
=-()-Rt- l ( 1),t>2 P t P l r: -
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 37Figure 5
inflation rate. Notealsothatthenominal amountofforced
savings per capita grows with time, since it is A- pet).
Chart 1shows the actualdataforEast Germany> Forthe
constraintto be binding,wemustverify that
A- ~f7(Rt) forallhand t ~ 1,
whichtranslates intothecondition
eventually meannegative consumption. HenceR,isneces-
sarily in [ ~ , Ii].
[
Notice that the comparative dynamics associated with
the "stable" stationary values 8. are in some sense per-
verse: an increase in the deficit raises 8., and lowers
inflation.Thus,wecannotrelyontherationalexpectations
dynamicsof thismodelto focus attention on government
deficitsasacauseofinflation. However, ithasbeenshown
in severalcontexts, boththeoretical andexperimental, that
learning reverses the stability of the stationary points
CR, Ii) relative to the rational expectations dynamics.4
Such learning schemes suggestthat we selectthe higher
stationarypointIi asourequilibrium. PointIi isassociated
with "classical" comparative dynamics: a higherdeficit
lowersIi, andthus raisesthe inflation rate. We appealto
theselearning dynamics asourjustificationforfocusing on
theRstationary equilibrium.
Ayoung agent'sbudgetsetisdepictedinFigure5:point
C is attainedwhen an interestrate of 1prevails (in other
wordswhenthepricelevel is constant) whereas pointB is
attained forR < 1.Theseigniorage function f(R)(1 - R)







Regime 2: A- > 0, andthecurrency constraintis always
binding
We now consider a regime in which A- is positive and
binding.
Evidently, ifthe currencyconstraintisbinding,h(t)=A-
for allt ~ 1,and
d
d=A-(l-Rt ) or Rt=R=l-""5:.
Another condition mustalsohold, namely, thatconsump-
tionremainpositive. Thisimposes on A- thecondition that
A- < mln (wf) = ~I'
whichtranslates intothefollowing condition onR:
R < 1 _.!!- = R*
!QI




Nominal Savings Per Capita








Thus, the inflation rate is unique, constant, and positive.









2, aswesaw. Theotheristhattheinitialpricelevelp(1) is
higherin regime 1.
Tosee this, wesolve forp (1). Thegovernment budget
constraint at t= 1is
Budget set in Regime 1
Budget set in Regime 2
o




Thus,aslongasthelegalconstraint onmoney holdings is
binding,theinitialpricelevel is higherin regime 1.
Thisresultcanbe reformulated in thefollowing terms:
suppose thatregime 2hasbeeninforce fromt=lon, and
that, attimet=to,thelegalrestriction onmoney holdings
isremoved unexpectedly, allotherparameters ofthe prob-
lemremaining unchanged. Then, eitherthe deficit is too
highto be financed andmoney becomes worthless imme-
diately, or else it can be financed, in whichcircumstance
the actualprice level p(to) is higherthanwaspreviously
expected, andtheinflation rateishigherfromtoonthanat
any time before. This is the contentwe give here to the
phrase"repressedinflation."
d = H(1) - H(O)
Np(1) .
In regime1,theequilibrium condition yields

















ThusR is bounded above,away from 1; furthermore, R
mustlie in the regions of (0, R*) where condition (7) is
satisfied.
In the case of the logarithm utility function, (7) is
satisfiedif:a)d> d*, andthenitistrueforallR E (0,R*);
orb) 0SdS d*, andthenit is trueforR E (O,!n u (R,
R*). Notethata) corresponds to values ofthedeficit that
cannot befinanced inregime 1.Moreover, inb)thereturn
on money R can be chosento be higherthaninregime 1.
Figure 6 illustrates this: the seigniorage function
(1-R)f(R)isrepresented andtheregion below thatcurve
is shaded. Whenthedeficit isd2, itcannot befinanced by
voluntary holdings of money. A solution withforced sav-
ingscanbefound astheintersection ofthed2linewiththe
graphof 'A.(1 - R), withtheresulting rateR2•Ifthedeficit
is dl , it can be financed with or without the currency
constraint; with the constraint, a rate such as R, can be
achieved, whichishigherthanR. With alower value of 'A.,
lower ratesof returnare achieved, suchasR3.6
It is possible, depending on the utility function and
endowments, that every agent would prefer regime 2 to
regime 1.Thissituation isillustratedinFigure 7:pointAis
that attained in regime 1,pointB in regime 2: theutility
level is higher under the forced savings regime. Thus
regime 2couldbejustifiedontwogrounds, depending on
thelevel ofdeficitthegovernmenthaschosentofinance via
inflation: that this deficit is too high to be financed with
voluntary holding ofmoney by agents, orthatthegovern-
mentcanimprove agents' welfare bymoving from regime
1to regime 2.




> 0 andRs = 0 ~ < 1.
1
Th~ constantPwistheunique non-inflationary solution, in
WhICh R, = 1. For all other solutions, R, = R, < 1is a
constant,andlimt_>oop(t) = 00. Thesameargument about
stabilityunderlearning,asdescribed above, will serveto
selectthenon-inflationary equilibrium, inotherwords the
onewiththehighestreturnonmoney. We willconsiderthis




. h ( h h)· WIt 001,00 2 IS
ht ) m{\r(t) + l {\r(t)
c(\t + () < w
h
Pw t - 1
c7(t+1) < wh + m{\r(t) + l{\r(t)
t - 2 Pw(t+ 1)
m{\r(t) ~ O.
Lenders are indifferent between holding money or pri-
vate debt, while borrowers will set m{\r13(t) = 0 and
l{\rl3(t) :s o.
The government of country West is assumed to be
runninga "tight" policy: the deficitis set to D =0 in all
periods, andthemoney stockisconstant,H(r) = H(0) for
all t. Taxes are set so as to achieve this goal.
.Thisismerely aparticularcaseofregime1,withD = 0;
WIth the logarithmic utilityfunctions, weknowthatthere
may be two stationary solutions f3 and 1. Indeed, the
equilibrium condition is
! l{\r(t)+m{\r(t) = ! h _ Hw(O) (8)
h Pw(t) h fw(t) - Pw(t) ,t~ 1
and withlogarithmic utilityfunctions (8) becomes
OF Pw(t+ 1) O~ Hw(O)
2 - Pw(t) T = Pw(t) . (9)
Thegeneralsolution tothisfirst-orderdifference equation
inP(t) is found to be
Pw(t) = Pw + (Pw(O) - Pw) ( ~ )t
s
IncountryEast, appropriate socialarrangements ensure
that all agentsreceive identical after-tax endowments ("I
)
. l'
"12 , "11 > "12' m all generations t ~ 1. Agents within a
generation are identicalin preferences and endowments
which implies that there will be no intra-generational
lending:each agentchooses l ~(t) = O.
Thegovernment ofEastfaces aconstantpositive deficit
of taxrevenues withrespecttoitsexpenditures, sothatfor
all t~.1
GE(t) - ~ 77(t) - t 77-1(t) = DE
with D.E > O. It h~s chosen to resort to a currency
constraI~t, sothatregime 2 asdescribed above prevails in
East. ThIS meansthattheequilibrium pricelevel pathisof
the form:
1
PE(t) = PE(l)( R )t-I
E






IncountryWest,NI agents have theendowment (o <x )
while N2=Nw- NI agents have the endowment (f3I~~2).
We assumethat
<Xl > <X2and f32 > ~I'
which makes the first type of agents (indexed by Wo)
"lenders" and the second type (indexed by Wf3) "bor-
:owers". A consequence of this assumption will be to
mtroduce some distributional effects of the events which
will happenin Sections V andVI. It is assumed that
NI<X2 + N2f32 0 ~ = - <1
NI<XI + N2~I 0 tv '
which insures existence of equilibria with valued fiat
currency.
Agentssolve themaximization problem (P) referredto
a?ove and ~hoose to holdprivate debt as wellas money:
SInce westillassumethatprivate debtis notindexed the
budget constraint of a young agentin the Westendowed
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We consider the following situation. At some date,
whichwerenormalize tobet= 0, theWall separating East
and West unexpectedly disappears. The two countries
unite, andbecome provinces of a singlecountry. Thetwo
governments merge toform asingle government. Thisnew
government inherits the streamof expenditures and pre-
unification taxes, andhasthepower to impose new taxes
onthecitizens ofboth(former) countries. Wewill assume
that the newgovernment enacts the following rule: resi-
dentsofeachhalfofthenewcountry maymove totheother
half, in which case they will receive an endowment of
(0,0). 7 This ensures that the distribution of population
remains the same afterunification: agents willnot move
between the two provinces, and they can be taxed at
different rates,depending onpriorcitizenship (that is, on
their currentplace of residence). The singlegovernment
also has the ability to issue a currency calledthe Mark
(denoted M). These arrangements prevail fort 2:. 1. Atthe
beginning of period 1, all West Marks are exchanged for
Marks oneforone, andallEastMarks areexchanged atthe
rate ofone EMfore M. Thegovernment chooses e, and
setsA= 0, which means thatintheEastthecompulsion to
holdcurrency hasbeeneliminated.
Our purpose in this section is to describe theclassof
exchange rates, interest rates, price levels, andinflation
ratesthatareconsistent withthesenewarrangements. We
establish thefollowing:
1. If the consolidated government adopts the fiscal
policies of the two preexisting governments, so that the
deficit oftheconsolidated government issimply thesumof
thedeficits ofthetwo priorgovernments, itmayormay not
be feasible to effect monetary unification without fiscal
changes, depending onhowbigtheconsolidated deficit is.
2. If it is feasible for the new government to effect
monetary unification under a fixed policy that simply
consolidates thedeficits ofthetwo countries, then there isa
large number of admissible exchange rates. For young
people bornatt 2:. 1, welfare is identical foranyfeasible
choice ofanexchange rate. Fortheoldatt = 1,who bring
theiroldEastandWest Marks intothenew unified system,
the choice of the exchange rate matters. Easterners are
betteroff, thehigher thevalue chosen fore.
3. If the fiscal policy of the new government simply
consolidates andcontinues thedeficits of theoldgovern-
ments, the move to monetary unification raises the infla-
tionratein theWest andmayor may notreduce it in the
East, depending on the real value of the constraint pre-
viously imposed. All western lenders born at t ::::. 1 are
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
madebetteroffbythischange. Western borrowers bornat
t::::, 1aremadeworse offbythis change.
4.Theincreasedinflation rateimposed onwesterners by
the monetary unification can be avoided by reducing the
deficit oftheconsolidated government. Theconsequences
for different citizens' welfare of this deficit reduction
depends onprecisely which people's taxes areraised.
Thenew government hasthepossibility todepartfrom
priortaxing practices; anynewtaxes it decides uponwill
be denoted 'T7(i) (tax onagenth ofgeneration t in period
i E {I,2}ofhislife). Theresulting after-taxendowmentwill
bedenoted w 7(i). Theaggregate taxburdenontheyoung
(respectively old)inperiod tisdenoted T1(t) (respectively
T2 (t)). Our assumptions imply thatthe government may
forever taxyoung andoldin each (former) country sepa-
rately; therefore bothT1(t) andT2 (t) may carryE andW
superscripts.
Theoldgeneration attimet = 1,whoareindexed0, have
thebudgetconstraints
h m~(O)_
easternborrowers: cE(l) -::; e p(l) + 'Y2
western lenders: c{\r(l)-::; m{\r(~(:)l{\r(O) + &2
western borrowers: c{\r(l)S m{\r(~(:;{\r(O) + ~2





ct(t) + p(t) ~ wt(t)
m(t)+l(t)
c/t+1)S w/t+ 1) + p(t+ 1)




D(t) = p(t) - Rt- 1 p(t-l) ,t> 1 (lIa)
D(I)= H(I) _ Hw(O)+eHE(O)
p(l) p(l) (lIb)
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D(t) = Dw(t)+DE(t) = (-TF(t)-Tr(t-1)
+ (DE -Tf(t)-T~(t-l».
Theequilibrium condition is, forallt ~ 1:
Ft(Rt) =N1f'fa.(Rt) + N2f'f13(Rt) + NEff(Rt)
H(t)
pet) .
Thefollowing proposition is a straightforward applica-
tion of the Kareken and Wallace (1981) result on the
indeterminacy ofexchange rates.
Proposition 1. Given an equilibrium {Rt, pet), H(t),
(1' 7-1(t), l'7(t))h'C7-1 (r), C7(t),e} '7=1 ,foranyeE(0,00)
thereexistsanotherequilibrium satisfyingRt= k; l'7-1(t)
= f7-1(t), 1'7(t)= f7(t), c7(t)=c7(t), c7(t+1) =
C7(t+1)for allh; andp (t) =1= pet),B(t) =1= Ii(t),forall
t, c3(1) =1= c3(1).
Proof:
We take as given thata monetary equilibrium exists; the
macron-bearing equilibrium, {Rt,pet), B (t), 15(t), e}'7=l'
solves (11) and (12). Foranychoice of eE (0,00),wecan
construct a caret-bearing equilibrium as follows. Given a
choiceof e, combine (lIb) and(12) into
D(I) = F (R) _ Hw(O)+eHE(O)
1 1 p(1)
Solvethisequation forp(l) to get
A(1) = Hw(O)+eHE(O). (13)
p F1(R1)- D(1 )
Sincethemacron-bearing equilibrium solves (11) and(12)
with positive money stocks, thedenominator ontheright
hand side of (13) is positive, and (13) can be solved for
P(1)· Then p(t+l)=p(t)/Rp and (12) gives fi(t) =
Ft(Rt)p(t). Sincefi(t)/p(t) = B(t)/p(t), (l1a) willbe
satisfied. 8
One can interpret this proposition in the following
sense: foragiven fiscal policy{(1'7-1(t), 1'7(t) )h}'7=1such
that money has value in equilibrium, there are corre-
sponding sequences of "real" variables {Dt, Rt,(c7(t),
c7(t+1))h }'7= t- There is a continuum of price paths
{p(t)}'7= 1(andcorrespondingpaths{H(t)}'7= 1)consistent
with these sequences, indexed byp(1); thechoice ofe E
(0,00) issufficient toselect thepricepathviaequation (13)
(which gives p (1) as an affine? function of e), without
altering anyotheraspect oftheequilibrium. Theexistence
itselfoftheequilibrium isadisjoint issue from thechoice
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ofthe exchange rate, andisamenable tothesame analysis '
aswas conductedinSectionII.Moreover, since thewelfare
of generations t ~ 1depends only on R, and noton the
specific price level path, the choice of e affects only the
consumption oftheoldatt= 1.Forthelatter, eachchoice
of e corresponds to a particular distribution ofconsump-
tiongood.
When does a monetary equilibrium exist? Figure 8 will
be helpful in this context. The seigniorage functions of
bothprovinces f E(R)(1- R) andfW(R)(1- R) have been
represented, as well as the sum F (R) (1-R). Since the
unified country will not resort to the A constraint, a
monetary solution is found astheintersection ofthey = d
linewiththegraphofF (R) (1 - R). Ifthenew government
simply consolidates East's deficit without raising taxes,
that is, D(t)=DE, then a monetary equilibrium mayor
may not exist. In Figure 8, the deficit d2 cannot be
financed, although itwas financed byEastunderregime 2.
Ontheotherhand,d1canbefinanced. The value d* isthe
largestdeficit thatcanbe financed.
If an equilibrium exists in the unified country, the
inflation rate will rise in West, simply because it was 0
previously (Rw= 1), and because R= 1 is incompatible
withapositivedeficit. AsforEast,theinflationratemay be
higheror lower, depending on the choice of A that was
made initially. For AI' the new rate of return R will be
higherthanR1, andconversely forR2 . It is alsoapparent
that,shouldthedeficitbelowered, theinflation ratemay be
made lower. How this affects agents' welfare, however,
willdepend onwhois taxed to finance thisdeficit reduc-
tion.
Thus, if wecompare the welfare of generations t < 0
withthatofgenerations t ~ 1(andassume thattaxes are




With logarithmic preferences, the saving function for
eachconsumer is
p(1) > Pw(1) ifandonlyif
__ _ _ _ _ _ _2H--=..E(_O_)e_______ (1)
>Pw r






01-T1 02-T2 H(t) t f7(R,) = 2 - 2R, = pet) ,
andthe government's budgetconstraint
D =H __ (t_)-_H~(t_-_1)
pet)
which,underaboundedness condition onD, hassolutions
oftheform
pet) = a( ;1 )'-1 + b( }2 )'-1 withR. > R2,
where aandbaresubjecttotheconditionthatp(t)remains
positive, as wellas to theinitialcondition
°-T °-T Dp(1) = 1 1p(l) - 2 2 p(2)
2 2
- Hw(O) - eHE(O). (17)
Astationary orconstant-inflation equilibrium corresponds
toa=p(l), b=O or to a=O, b=p(1). In bothcases,the
path{p(t)} ';"= 1isofthe form
pet) = p(1)( ~. )'-1, i E {1,2}
I
andimposing (17)determines p(l) as
p(1) = 2(Hw(O)+eHE(O)) (18)
01-Tl+ (02-T2)IRj - 2D
Thus, p(1) is an affine function of the exchange rate




Equations (14) and (15) imply a second-order difference
equation inp(t)
(01-Tl)P(t+1) - (01-Tl+02-T2-2D)p(t)
+ (02 - T2)p(t-1) = 0 (16)
we see thatwhile western lenders will necessarily suffer
(andwestern borrowers benefit) from the unification and
theensuingincrease in inflation, easterners canbebetter
orworse off. Which way easterners' welfare goes does not
depend on the exchange rate chosen, but rather on the
extent to whichthey wereconstrained initially. We refer
againto Figure7 onthisquestion.
Remembering thatfw(l) > 0forlenders, itisclearthatthe
welfare oflenders worsens, thehighertheactual price level
is in period 1, and conversely for borrowers (inflation
benefits debtors). Whether they are betteroff than if the
Wall hadn't fallen depends onwhether pw=Pw(1) >p(1).
Theeastern old'swelfare falls when elp(l) falls; whether
they are better off without the Wall depends on whether
ePE(l)Ip (1) > 1. Notethattheeasternold'sinterests donot
necessarily conflict with that of either class of west-
ern old.10
Thus,toevaluate thewelfare consequences ofthemove
to monetary union, weneedto specify whatfiscal policy
the new government adopts. Thisfiscal policy willdeter-
minethenewequilibrium returnoncurrency R,aswell as
the the price level p(1) as a function of e. To compute
solutions for various fiscal policies, we return to the
assumption thatpreferences areidentical inbothcountries
andof thelogarithmic form studied above.
Let us consider the case where the new government
decides to tax the young of all generations and of both
provinces by anamount T1 = !h 1'1 intheaggregate, and
theoldbyanaggregate amount T2 =! h l' ~, fort ~ 1soas
to setaconstant deficitD=DE - T1- T2 ~ 0 foralit ~ 1
(recall thattheprevious deficit pathswereDEforEastand
oforWest).
Welfare implications for the t= 0 generation
We nowconsider thewelfare implications ofmonetary
unification for the old at time t= 1. Forall save the first
generation, welfare is identical underalltheequilibria of
Proposition 1above. Fortheoldattimet= 1,ontheother
hand,thereallocation effects ofvarying theexchange rate
are important, simply because they are exchanging their
oldmoney forthenew one, inbothprovinces. To seethis,
rewrite theeastern old'sconsumption in period1as
h _ PEel) Pw(l)
CE(l) - 'Y2 + e pw(l) p(l) REfE(RE)
where PEel) denotes the price level which would have
prevailed had the Wall not fallen. For the western old,
consumption is
h _ Pw(l) _ Pwpel)
cw(1) - w2 + p(l) Rwfw(Rw)-W2+fw(l)




NE("i1 - "i21R;)+11 2(1-1IRi ) - 2DE+TI+(2+11R;)T2
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suchthatp(1) > Pw(1) if andonly ife > e*.
Note that e* may possibly be negative. But if it is
positive, andifthegovernment chooses e < e*, a relative
deflation intheWest"willtakeplace inperiod 1,western
lenders will be made better off and western borrowers
worse off than withthe Wall. Conversely, fore > e*, a
relative inflation willoccurinperiod 1.This critical value
of theexchange ratedoes notdepend onthepricelevel in
country East(which isdetermined by A) butrather onthe
ratio of money stocks, on endowment and population
parameters, andonthefiscal policy chosen. Inparticular,
thevalue e:=Pw(1)/PE(1) isirrelevant totheoccurrence of
inflation intheWest inperiod 1,andtothewelfare ofthe
western old. However, e: matters for the eastern old's
welfare, which willbehigher than with theWall ifandonly
if ele: > p(1)/Pw(1). Thevalue e: can be thought of as
representing a "blackmarket exchange rate"atthetimeof
unification.
We canconsiderafew examples: onepossibility open to
the government is simply to leave after-tax endowments
identical to what they were before unification. In other
words, the East's deficit is left intact and financed by
inflation, andT, = T2 = O. We thenrewrite (18) as
( 2
Hw(O) + eHE(O)
P 1) = ill - il2/Ri - 2DE
The critical value is
Hw(O) NE('Yl-'Y2/Ri) + il2(1 - lIRJ - 2DE et =---=----'-''---...:..::...----=:.-=---=-;,:------=----~
HE(0) ill - il2
Another possibility is forthegovernment to tax only the
young of each generation so that T2=0, in which case
* _ Hw(O)
e (Tl) - HE(O) x
NE'Yl-NE'Y2/Ri (Tl) +il2 (1-1/Ri (Tl)) - 2DE+Tl
ill-il2
We must keep in mind that R, will change with Tl . If
T, = D, which corresponds to a balanced budget policy,
thenR = 1orR= il2 / ill'
These examples illustrate theway inwhich thegovernment
has the ability to choose an initial inflation or deflation
(i.e.,p (1)> Pw(1)orP(1) <Pw(1)), onceithaschosen a
fiscal policy.
V. The Effects ofanAnticipated Unification
which is then solved forPw(T - 1) asa function ofp (T).
Young agents ofprevious generations 1:;t:;T- 1willbe
solving the same problem, and the path {Pw(1), ... ,




m(T- 1)+l (T- 1)
C T-l(T-l)+ Pw(T-l) ::;: WI
)
_ m (T- 1)+l (T- 1)
CT- l (T .9i>2+ P (T) ,
the solution to which is again represented by the saving
function!}_l (Pw(T~ 1)/P(T)). Theequilibrium condi-
tioncanthenbe written
We now examine theconsequences ofa delay between
the announcement of monetary unification and the time
at which it is implemented. We makethe following as-
sumptions.
All arrangements described in the first paragraph of
SectionIV are announced at time 1to be prevailing for
t> T.Inperiods t= 1,... ,T- 1,thesame arrangements as
before are maintained, that is, both countries remain
separate, government spending andtaxes areunchanged,
East stillimposes savings restrictions, andsoon.
We assume that at t = 1 a fiscal policy is specified
for periods t:::::"'T, by which we mean that {('T7-l(t),
'T7(t))h}":'=Tareannounced; aratee, atwhich EastMarks
willbereceived att= Tin exchange fornew Marks, isalso
announced at t = 1. Agents can therefore compute the
equilibrium allocations andpricepaths.
Attime T, everything willproceed exactly asinSection
IV; E andW subscripts willdisappear, theoldofgenera-
tionT- I will exchange theirmonies formint-fresh Marks,
markets will open, a price level P(T) (which can be
computed given thefiscal parameters) willprevail.
I jh (Pw(T-1)) = Hw(O)
h T-l peT) Pw(T-I)
(19)
44 Economic Review / Fall1990Clearly, if p (T) = Pw, then the price level remains
constant, and if p (T) < Pw the price level will fall
increasingly rapidly asT approaches.
Itshould alsobenoted thatthevalue ofp(T)determines
which path of price levels will prevail in the period
t= 1,... , T, andtherefore theinterestrateswhichagents
ofgenerations 1toTface. Thismeansthatthechoice ofthe
exchange rate affects the real allocations of all agents in
generations 1toT, thesameway consumption ofthe oldat
timeof unification depended on the exchange rate in the
previous section.
Pw(T-I)} can be computed through a backward re-
cursion.
Inthecaseoflogarithmic utilityfunctions, (19) takesthe
form
fir _ fiw Pw(T) = Hw(O)
2 2 2pW(T - 1) Pw(T - I) or
Pw(T-1) = Rs-1 P (T) + 2Hn~0) (20)
1
Thisis solved backward to give
Pw(t)= Pw+(p (T) - Pw)(Rsy-tfor1S.t<T-1 (21)
which is just another version of (10), with a specific
starting condition. Therefore, if P (T) > Pw (as in the
examples at the end of Section IV), there will be a
progressiveincreaseinthepricelevel untilitreachesP(T);
andP(t) willincrease atanaccelerating rateasunification
approaches. Duringthatperiod, theinflation rateincreases
butremains bounded above by1IRs. ThetimepathofP(t)
isshown inFigure9. Theinitialboutofinflation atthetime
unification is announced is
Pw(l) = 1 + (p(T) - l)(R V-I
Pw(O) Pw s'
whichis increasing inP (T), and, givenp (T), isdecreas-
ing in 1. It can be shown that Rs > .5 is a sufficient
condition for inflation to be higher in period 1 than in
period2, as illustrated byFigure 9.
Figure 9
o 1 T
VI. Anticipated Unification with Uncertainty
Wenow add a newwrinkle to the previous set-up, by
introducing someuncertainty overtheexchange ratetobe
chosenattimeT.
At time 1, the same announcements are made as in
Section V: the two countries will unite at time T, a
consolidated government willtakecharge ofbothstreams
of government expenditures, and tax residents of both
provinces. A fiscal policy is announced, which supports
a monetary equilibrium. All parameters of the policy
are made known, except for the exchange rate e. It is
announced that the government will randomly choose
among n possible exchange rates (eI , ... , en), with
probabilities ('IT't> ..• , 'IT'n) where Ij'IT'j=1. The choice
willbemade atthebeginning ofperiodT. These induce n
states of the worldin periodT. There isno otheruncer-
tainty.
As Proposition 1makes clear, theinformation available
to agents allows them to compute the equilibrium se-
Federal Reserve Bankof SanFrancisco
quences of consumptions and interest rates, for t ::::. T,
whichwillbeidentical inallstatesoftheworld. Theprice
andmoney stocksequences, however, willdepend onthe
(random) exchange rate: in particular, n possible price
levels may prevail in period T, namely (PI (T), ... ,
Pn(T)), computed frome1ande2 by using (13):
Hw(T)+ejHE(T) .
pj(T) = FT(RT)-D(T) for 1 = 1,... , n.
Theprobabilities attached to the pricelevels are ('IT'l'... ,
'IT'n). Itismorehelpful tothinkofthisdistribution interms
of the value money may have in each state, that is, the
reciprocals ofthepricelevels (lIP1(T), ... , lIPn(T)).
Wewill assume that agents maximize expected utility,
andthatutilityis additively separable, oftheform
u(c(t), c(t+l)) = u(c(t)) + u(c(t+l)).
We assume thatfinancial markets available toagents of
45maxE{u(ch(T-l» + u(ch(T))} = u(ch(T-I»
'IT.
k, = H (D) +n2fJjeT)
anduse (22)to solve forqi as functions ofRT-1:
1 kiPi(T) .
qi =-R I~ k. .(T) fori = 1,... ,n (33)
T-1 )= 1 '] p)
We then invoke (23) to obtain another relation between
p(T-1) andRT- 1:
p(T-1) = pRT- 1 (34)
'IT.
cr(T) = -! ch(T-l). (3D.O
qi
When thesevalues are substituted into (26) wefind
wq wh
ch(T - 1) = -2 + 2 (31)










Thisequation relates p(T-1) andRT- 1•
Wecan use (28) and (3D) to obtain
I ch(T-l) =!li. I c?(T)
h 'IT i h
qi (H(D) n )_ !l.L ( H(D)
'ITi Pi (T) + 2 - 'ITj Pj(T)
q. q), or 1 = _-:":_"..,,-
Pi (T)ki p/T)k j
where wedenote
Once p(T-l) and RT- 1 are solved for using these
equations, the next steps are identical to those taken in
Section V. An agent of generation T- 2 faces a pair
of prices (p(T- 2), P(T- 1) and an interestrate RT - 2
(which must equal p(T- 2) /P(T- 1) to preclude arbi-
trage).Hissaving function canbederived thesameway as
before, equilibrium willimpose
h p(T-2) _ H(D)
~ fT-2(p(T-l) ) - p(T-2)
which allows us to compute p (T - 2) givenp (T - 1), and
soforthtop(l). Theonlygeneration toface uncertainty is
generation T- 1.















ch(T - 1)+ I q. cIJ(T) < to h + 2 (26)




Thefirst orderconditions are (26) and
fori = 1,... ,n 'ITi u'(cr(T)=u'(ch(T-l». (27)
qi
Equations (26-27) describe eachagent'sbehavior.
Themarket-clearing conditions onallfinancial markets
i slJ= H(D)
h=l 1 pJT)
can be written in theform
~ h _ h _ H(D)
7: (ci(T) ( 2 ) - pi(T)
H(D)
I
h (w1-ch(T- l » =---
p(T-l)
n
ch (T - 1) + I q.slJ < wh
i=l 1 1 - 1
clJ(T)< wh+s lJ
1 - 2 I
Note that the agent now has n+1 budget constraints,
whichcanbeconsolidated intoa singlebudgetconstraint
subjectto theconstraints
Equation(29) isredundant butconvenient. Equilibrium is
characterized by conditions (26-28).
generation T- 1 can be represented by n markets for
claimsononeunitofconsumption instatei. Wedenote qi
asthepricesoftheseclaims,andsrasthequantity ofsuch
claims bought(or sold)by the agent. Thepriceof a real
loan andthepriceof a nominal loancanbe derived from
these n securities prices as
Money istherefore oneoftheassets available to theagent
forpurposes oftransfering wealth across timeandstatesof
the world.
Wewillagainproceed by backward recursion, starting
from the generation bornrightbefore unification, at time
T - 1.Theproblem solved byan agentofgenerationT-l
will be
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Pt-l P+ (P(T-l)-p)(ill/il2Y-Y
R, = -p; = P + (P(T-l)-p)(ill/il2y-Y+l
andillIil2 > 1ensures theresult.
Theproposition confirms what intuition might suggest:
wecompare aworld where money willhave acertain value
at time T, to one where the future value of money is
uncertain, butonaverage thesame. Inotherwords, inthe
second situation wehave introduced some randomness in
thevalue ofmoney, around agiven mean. Thesame way a
risk-averse agentwillprefer to receive withcertainty the
meanvalue ofalottery, rather thanthelottery itself, wefind
that in our model the demand for money (which is
n
j~l (o.j-a)(j(o.) - f(a)) <0
n n
j~l (o.j-a)(j(o.) - i~l'ITJ(o.i)) < 0
n n
j~l o.J(o.j) - a( i~l 'ITif(o.i)) < 0
Proof:
The lemma establishes that p > p(T). From (35), it is
apparentthatp(T-l)>P(T-l),andfrom(34)thatRY _ l
<R y - l . Since equation (36) describes bothpaths ofprice
levelsinbothequilibria, itmustbethatP(t) >P(r)for1'5:. t
::5T- 2 as well. Asfortherates ofreturn,
We are now in a position to compare two possible
policies. First, the government may announce a non-
degenerate distribution of possible exchange rates (el ,
'ITl;...;en' 'ITn). This distribution induces adistribution of
pricelevels (PI(T), 'ITl;" .; Pn(T), 'ITn), andadistribution
of values of money (1IPl(T), 'ITl;.·.; lIPn(T), 'ITn). We
call the mean value of money E(1IP(T)) = Ir=1
'ITiIPi (T). This results intheequilibrium sequence {p(1),
Rl' ..., P(T- 1), Ry ~I} which we just computed, and
which wecalltheequilibrium underuncertainty.
Alternatively, thegovernment, exactly as in Section V,
may announce thatanexchange rateewillbechosen with
certainty at time T: we denote {p(1), RI>'''' p(T-l),
R y -1' P(T)} the corresponding equilibrium sequence,
which we call the equilibrium undercertainty for short.
We consider the case where e is such that 1IP(T) =
E(l/p(T)).
Thelemma implies:
Proposition 2. Assume logarithmic utilityfunctions. In
the equilibrium under uncertainty, the price levels for
t= 1,... , T- 1arehigher, andtherates ofreturn lower,
than in the equilibrium under certainty with IIp(T) =
E(llp(T)).
(36)
Note thatfis strictly decreasing inx: therefore
o.j'.?:aifff(o.) '5:.f(a)
(o.j-a)(j(o.j) - f(a)) < 0forallj
n
p = .I ( -----;:::.----.::---:-- )Pi(T).
1= 1
Lemma. In thelogarithmic utility case, for anydistribu-
tion(Pl(T), 'ITl;··· ;Pn(T), 'ITn),thefollowing holds:
1 -1
P > (E p(T)) .
Proof:
We wish toprove that
withpbeing thezero-inflation pricelevelprevailing before
t=O.
We establish thefollowing result:
n 'IT. n n
(i~l p/n )(i~lkiPi(T)) > i~lki
n 1 n pJT)
(i~l'ITi pJT) )(i~l'ITiB(O) + il
2Pi(T) )
> i 'IT._1_ =,.-:-::-:---=-P-:...i (~T-,--)---:-~
i=l 1 Pi(T) B(O) + il2Pi(T)
if we denote o.i = Ylp,(T), a = Ir= 1 o.i andf(x)
II (B(0)+il2 x ), wewant toprove
n n n
c.I 'IT. o..)(.I 'IT.j(0..)) > C.I 'IT. 0.. f(o.·));
1=1 1 1 1=1 1 I 1=1 1 1 1
Equations (32) and (34) at last allow us to solve for
p(T-l):
peT-1) = 2B(0) +il2 p (35)
ill ill
Note theformal analogy between (20) and(35). This will
allow an easycomparison withthe caseundercertainty.
SinceP(T- 1)issolved asafunction ofthedistribution
of (PI(T),... ,pn(T)), the price sequence {p(1), ... ,
P(T- 2)} can be solved for recursively, using equation
(20):
for1 ~ t ~ T-1,
n p(t)=p+(p(T-l)-p)( _1 )t-Y+l
il2
FederalReserve BankofSan Francisco 47H (0)/p (T-1), with H (0) identical in the two experi-
ments) willfall when uncertainty isintroduced. Theprice
level, andtheinflation rates, willbe higherin all periods
between the announcement and the implementation of
monetaryunion, because of theaddeduncertainty on the
future value of money.
Theproposition is set forth in termsof distributions of
pricelevels attimeT,andisnotlinkedtotheparticularway
in whichrandomness isintroducedinthepricelevel attime
T. Other forms of randomness maybe considered. Sup-
pose, for example, that the exchange rate is determined
with certainty at time 1 (e= 1, say), but fiscal policy
remainsindeterminate. Assuming thattheaggregate defi-
cit can be financed by inflation, and thatthegovernment
willchoose to finance some constantfraction 8 E [0,1] of
thatdeficit, the pricelevel at timeT is givenby equation
(13), where thedenominator F (RT ) - 8D = RT F (RT ) is
positive by assumption, anddecreasing in 8, as Figure 3
makes clear. Thusthe uncertainty over8, if the govern-
mentdoes not commit to a specific value before timeT,
willinducea distribution ofpossible values ofmoney, the
lowest oneassociated witha8=° andthehighestonewith
a balanced budget.
Thesameresultthenapplies: theaddeduncertainty has
the effectof increasing the price levels and the inflation
ratesinallperiods priortounification, when compared toa
choice offiscal policywhich would setthevalue ofmoney
1/p(T) at themeanofthepossible values of money.
VII. Final Comments
Themodel weusedinthispaperhas,asanymodel must
have, a number of limitations. Some are the inevitable
drawbacks which characterize any overlapping genera-
tions model; theyarewellknown, andthisisnottheplace
to discussthem. We mightmention thatthey oftenplague
other workable models of money. We ratherwishto point
out drawbacks that are specific to the model we used,
which should be borne in mind when trying to find
similarities between this model and actual persons or
events.
In ourmodel, thecountry once unified remains closed,
inthesamesensethetwocountries wereoriginallytakento
beclosed: there isnorestoftheworld, andconsequently no
foreign trade. As a result, we lose the abilityto discuss
consequences ofmonetary union ontrade, andwemissan
importantconsideration inthedetermination oftheinitial
inflationary shockat unification. As some have pointed
out, the DM is convertible, whereas the OM is not. East
Germans endowed with hard Marks would presumably
buy goods from abroadaswellasfromWest Germany, and
this mayhave a mitigating effect on inflation.
Inourmodel, thereareonlytwoperiods inagents' lives;
therefore, atthetimeofunification onlyoldpeoplecomein
fromtheEasttoexchange theirsoftMarks forhardMarks,
and theseoldpeople, byconstruction, onlywishto spend
theirbalances. Although thedemographic structure ofEast
Germanyisn't extremely different from thatofWest Ger-
many,12 in actuality some East Germans maynotwant to
spendalltheirfreshly mintedDMonbananas. Again,this
reducesthestrength ofinflationary forces.
Our model simply assumes that the new government
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converts all OM instantaneously into freely expendable
Marks, andata singleexchange rate. Theplanwhich will
.be implemented in Germany will not have this feature,
although anylegalrestriction ontheexpendability ofEast
German savings will have to be easily enforceable.P A
possible feature would have EastGermans buytheState's
capital stockwiththeirsavings; another would freeze part
of theirholdings for a period of time left to the Bundes-
bank'sdiscretion. It is alsopossible thata fraction ofEast
Germans' money holdings willbeconvertible atarate, and
theremainder at another, lessfavorable rate.
We have assumed thatthegoodwith which Easterners
areendowed isofthesamenature asthegood available for
purchase intheWest. Onemightobjectto sucharuthless
subsumption of BMWs and Trabants as identical com-
modities, andwantto allow forlessthanperfect substitu-
tion. To illustrate the argument, theresults of Section IV
can be re-examined with "VI="12 =0, in other words
withthe assumption thatgoods produced in country East
areconsidered worthless forconsumption purposes, once
agents are givena choice. Taking thisconsideration into
account would reinforce theinflationary factors. We have
alsoassumed thattheEasterners' endowments would not
change after unification. Incorporating such a feature
would change conclusions about inflationary forces, but
would alsoleave Proposition 1unchanged.
On a theoretical level, one might objectthat we have
assumed perfect foresight onthepartofouragents, before
aswellasafter, unification. Butwehave shown ouragents
expecting the Wall to remain in place indefinitely in
SectionIII, andwehave thenbetrayed theirexpectations in
EconomicReview / Fall1990Section IV (the element of surprise was of course crucial
for the trick played on the old people at time 1). Wewould
answer that we in fact assumed a particular probability
distribution, namely that the status quo would remainwith
probabilityl-: E, and that the Wallwould come downwith
NOTES
1. Asweremark later, thisresult is simply anapplication
andinterpretation ofthereasoning onwhich theexchange
rate indeterminacy result ofKareken andWallace (1981) is
based.
2. Models of this type usually specify that loans are
denominated in the consumption good (e.g. Sargent
(1987)). A departure from thisusage doesnotmatter ina
model with perfectforesight, suchasours, until such time
asanunanticipated change in policyoccurs.
3. Itispossible tointerpret therestriction onreal balances
asthe outcome of a commodity rationing scheme which
forces the young to hold more money than they would
want by limiting thegoodsavailable forpurchase. Notice
thatthescheme we useleaves old agents freetospend
theiraccumulated cash balances.
4. See Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Arifovic and
Sargent (1990) for some theoretical work on learning
schemes in the context of this model. See Marimon and
Sundar (1989) forsome experimental evidence.
5. "The growth of the total balance of savings is the
expression of the people's trustin the socialist develop-
ment of the German Democratic Republic, and in the
stability of itsmoney" (DDR Handbuch (1979)).
6. The two regimes described here obviously do not
cover all possibilities. For a given value of the deficit
o, S d*, and when A. is setas lowas A.2 in Figure 5,then
there are three stationary equilibria, one in which the
constraint isbinding with R=R3, andtwoinwhich itisnot
binding, withR= Ri orR= R2. Thus, when thedeficitcan
be financed by inflation alone, imposing the constraint
doesnotnecessarily implythatitwillbebinding, because
multiple equilibria arepossible.
7. This assumption isnotexcessive, inview ofthe severe
restrictions recently placedon eligibility of East German
citizens forsocial benefits inWest Germany.
Federal Reserve Bankof SanFrancisco
probability E (the latter is understood to be as small as
usual). We would further argue that this representation is
but a stylized version of most observers' probability dis-
tributions until the early days of October 1989.
8. The allocations oftheold at time0 will be affected by
p(1): at an extreme, for low values of p(1) the deflation
could be so severe that Western borrowers would be
unable to honor their commitments. In a sense, this is
irrelevant because theonlyeconomic forces determining
theequilibrium values ofvariables arethedecisions ofthe
young ofgenerations t ~ 1. However, agovernment wish-
ing to sparethe original old Western borrowers this pre-
dicament would choose ewithin a range (~, +C1J), where ~
verifies
Hw(O)+§ HE(O)Hw(O)+~HE(O) _ Ifo.,l3(Rw)1
Fi(Ri)-Di ~2
sothatold Western borrowers' consumption afterrepay-
ment of loans remains positive.
9. Avariable y issaidtobeanaffine function ofvariables
Xi, X2, ... .x; ifthere exist constants bo,b-, ... ,b; such
thaty=bo + b. Xi + ... + bnxn·
10. Hadwefollowed the usual practiceof denominating
private debt in real terms rather than nominal terms,
western borrowers would have been unaffected by the
unification, and western lenders would have been af-
fected through theirholdings of money only.
11. By relative deflation in the West we mean that
p(1) < Pw(1), that is, the price level actually prevailing at
time 1 is lower than it would have been, had the Wall
remained in place.
12. One East German out of four is overthe age of 50,
compared to one West German outofthree.
13. This paper was written before the details of the cur-
rency unification were worked out.
49DataAppendix
The following summarizes some of the available data
on the German economies. All amounts (except popula-
tion figures) are in billions of local currency. Sources
are Statistisches lahrbuch fur die BRD 1989, Deutsche
Bundesbank monthly report Apr. 1990, Encyclopedia
Britannica Yearbook 1989. 1
1. TSP is Total Social Product (the socialist version of
GNP, which excludes services, etc.). The 1990 figures for
savings inEast Germany andtheblackmarket exchange
rate arethe ones commonly cited (e.g. New York Times
March 14, 1990; International Herald Tribune Feb.10-11,



































Arifovic, J. and T.J. Sargent. "Three Models of Learning
about Deficits." Manuscript. 1990.
Bryant, J. and N. Wallace. "A Price Discrimination Analy-
sisof Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Studies
51(2),1984. pp. 279-288.
Handbuchder DDR. Leipzig: VEB Verlag Enzyklopadie.
1979.
Kareken, J.H. and N. Wallace. "On the Indeterminacy of
Equilibrium Exchange Rates," Quarterly Journal of
Economics 96(2),1981. pp. 207-222.
Marcet, A.andTJ. Sargent. "Least-Squares Learning and
the Dynamics of Hyperinflation," in W.A. Barnett, J.
Geweke, and K. Shell, eds., Economic Complexity:
Chaos, Sunspots, Bubbles and Nonlinearity. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989.
Marimon, R. andS.Sunder. "Rational Expectations versus
Adaptive Behavior inaHyperinflationary World." Dis-
50
cussion paper 244. Center for Economic Research,
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. 1988.
Samuelson, P.A. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of
Interest With or Without the Social Contrivance of
Money," Journal of Political Economy 66(6), 1958.
pp. 467-482.
Sargent, TJ. Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1987.
Sargent, TJ. andN. Wallace. "Some Unpleasant Monetar-
istArithmetic," Federal Reserve Bank ofMinneapolis
Quarterly Review 5(3),1981. pp. 1-17.
____"The Real Bills Doctrine vs. the Quantity The-
ory: A Reconsideration," Journal ofPolitical Economy
90(6), 1982. pp. 1212-1236.
Wallace, N. "TheOverlapping-Generations Model of Fiat
Money," inJ.H. Kareken andN. Wallace, eds., Models
of Monetary Economics. Minneapolis: Federal Re-
serve Bankof Minneapolis. pp. 49-82.
Economic Review / Fall1990